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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more tragic manifestations of current interna-
tional political unrest is the terrorist attack on passengers in air
terminals. On May 30, 1972, members of the Japanese Red
Army terrorist group assaulted passengers in the baggage claim
area of Lod International Airport at Tel Aviv with explosives
and automatic weapons.' On August 5, 1973, terrorists of the
Black September organization launched a similar attack on pas-
sengers in the international transit lounge of Athens' Hellenikon
Airport, killing three persons and wounding more than fifty.
2
Security measures originally designed to forestall aircraft hijack-
ings and sabotage are apparently inadequate to prevent attacks
in airports.3 Consequently, a serious possibility of more airport
massacres exists. Indeed, to the extent that aircraft themselves
are rendered less attractive targets because of effective security
measures, passengers in air terminals may be in more danger
now than before the advent of strict airport security.
If further attacks can be expected, effective legal means
must be developed to accomplish two important goals: terrorist
attack deterrence and compensation to the victims. This Com-
ment examines the alternative approaches under current law,
focusing special attention on two recent decisions4 holding the
I N.Y. Times, May 31, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
2 Id., Aug. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
3 Air transportation has frequently been a target for those using violence to attract
media attention to political dissatisfactions. Approximately 343 aircraft hijackings oc-
curred between 1961 and 1973. Although United States aircraft were the most favored
targets, aircraft registered in sixty other nations were also seized. See Evans, Aircraft
Hijacking: What is Being Done, 67 Am. J. INT'L L. 641, 643 (1973). Governmental concern
over hijacking led to the imposition of strict anti-air piracy measures in many nations.
Id. at 648-53. In the United States airport anti-hijacking measures are usually twofold:
magnetometers are used in the boarding passageways leading to aircraft to detect metal
objects and hijacker behavioral profiles are used to alert security guards to the charac-
teristics of potentially dangerous persons. Abramovsky, The Constitutionality of the Anti-
Hijacking Security System, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 123, 131-32 (1972). The phenomenon of
terrorist attacks in airport terminals presents an unmet challenge to law enforcement
officials. The magnetometers and behavioral profiles may help prevent actual seizure of
aircraft, but they are incapable of deterring terrorists who enter a terminal undetected
and indiscriminately attack waiting passengers.
4 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en
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airline liable under the Warsaw Convention 5 for injuries to pas-
sengers sustained in the Hellenikon attack. The principal find-
ings are that all of the current approaches are faulty in various
respects but one approach-suits against the governments con-
trolling the airports-is superior to the others. The final conclu-
sion is that legal or extra-legal reforms are needed to meet the
problems of airport terrorist attacks adequately.
II. STRICT LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS
UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION
A. Day and Evangelinos
In Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.6 and Evangelinos v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.7 the Second and Third Circuits ruled that
passengers could recover for injuries sustained in the Hellenikon
Airport attack of 1973.8 Recovery in both cases was based on
provisions of the Warsaw Convention 9 and the Montreal
Agreement' that create an irrebuttable presumption of air car-
rier liability for injuries sustained while embarking. These results
do partially meet the objective of compensating injured passen-
gers but generally cannot withstand close analysis either as appli-
cations of the Warsaw Convention and prior case law or as mat-
ters of public policy."
The facts which gave rise to the litigation in Day and
Evangelinos can be summarized briefly. The terrorist raid oc-
curred at approximately 3:00 P.M. Athens time.' 2 Before that
hour the passengers scheduled to depart on TWA's flight 881 to
New York were occupied with the normal preparations for in-
banc); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 890 (1976).
5 Warsaw Convention, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (ratified by the United States Oct. 29, 1934).
6 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
7 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
8 In Day the court affirmed the district court's holding that the passengers could
recover; in Evangelinos the court reversed the district court's ruling that the passengers
could not recover.
9 Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, T.S. No. 876 at 21,
137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
10 Agreement CAB 18900, 31 Fed. Reg. 7,302 (1966). See text accompanying notes
20-24 infra.
11 The only other circuit court deciding a terrorist attack case under article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention denied recovery. Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279 (1st
Cir. 1976), aff'g In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975). See text accompanying
notes 72-75 infra.
12 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 218 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 528
F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
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ternational air travel. Arriving passengers presented their
tickets at the TWA check-in counter. After receiving their
boarding passes, baggage checks, and seat assignments they
were directed to the passport and currency control stations.
They then moved to the international transit lounge on the field
level section of the airport. Passengers generally may not return
to the terminal proper once they have entered the transit
lounge.' 3 In due course the TWA ground attendants advised the
passengers over the public address system that the flight was
ready for departure. The passengers formed one queue for men
and one for women for the physical searches required by the
Greek police before they were allowed to board a bus provided
to carry them across the runway to the idling aircraft some one
hundred yards away. 14 A lucky few had already been searched
and were on their way to the bus, operated by Olympic Airways
not by TWA, when the terrorists attacked and pandemonium
erupted. 15 The helpless passengers standing in line were easy
targets. The result was terrible injury and loss of life leading to
the tort litigation in the United States. Because recovery in both
cases resulted from the strict liability provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, it is useful to discuss the treaty before directly
analyzing the cases.
B. The History of Strict Liability Under
the Warsaw Convention
During the infancy of commercial air travel the interna-
tional community recognized the need for coordinated control
over this hazardous, multinational industry. Lawyers, diplomats,
and businessmen proposed to establish baseline controls through
a multilateral treaty. After the technical preparation was com-
pleted by a committee of aviation experts in 1929, an interna-
tional air law conference convened at Warsaw. The two primary
goals of the meeting were to standardize relevant documentation
(e.g., tickets, waybills) and claims procedures, and to limit the
13 Id. at 219.
4
ld. at 219-20.
1 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 98 (W.D. Pa. 1975),
rev'd, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). An unexpected scheduling quirk added
cruel irony to the irrationality of the assault. The terrorists intended to strike pas-
sengers on TWA's flight 881 to Tel Aviv. The passengers actually attacked were for
the most part ticketholders on TWA's flight 881 to New York. An airport employee
mistakenly manipulated the electronic sign above the gate to indicate wrongly that the
waiting passengers were bound for Tel Aviv. The terrorists were misled by the sign and
directed their fire at the wrong group. Id. at 97-98.
1136
AIRPORT TERRORIST ATTACKS
liability of the air carriers. Limitation of liability was considered
especially important because early air travel was intrinsically
dangerous and it was feared that heavy tort judgments would
stifle the growth of the industry.16 The resulting agreement,
known as the Warsaw Convention, essentially achieved both
goals. The treaty protected injured passengers by creating a re-
buttable presumption of liability on the part of international air
carriers under certain circumstances. Article 20(1) excused a car-
rier from liability upon proof that it had "taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for [it] to
take such measures.' 7 Another provision protected the airlines
by limiting liability to 125,000 Poincar6 francs (about 8,300
United States dollars),' 8 a low limit even in 1929.19
In the years following the Convention's ratification interna-
tional airlines became more fiscally robust. In the United States,
where tort damage judgments were often higher than those in
the rest of the world, the Convention's limits on recovery for
passenger injury were viewed as unreasonably low. 21' After some
inconclusive attempts to increase the limits of liability,21 the
United States became sufficiently dissatisfied with the liability
limitation to send a notice of denunciation to the Government
of Poland as repository of the Convention. The United States
-indicated that it would withdraw from the Convention in six
months unless the world's airlines agreed to raise the liability
limits.2 2 This extraordinary pressure by the treaty's most im-
portant signatory proved effective. United States withdrawal
from the Warsaw Convention was prevented by a spate of hasty
consultations between United States representatives and agents
of the world's international air carriers. The compromise,
known as the Montreal Agreement, is a private compact be-
16 See, e.g., Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-501 (1967). This article offers an excellent discussion of the
history of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent modifications up to the Montreal
Agreement.
17 Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 20, 49 Stat. at 3019, T.S. No. 876 at 22,
137 L.N.T.S. at 24.
18 Id. art. 22(1), 49 Stat. at 3019, T.S. No. 876 at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25.
19 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 499-500.
21 See Very, The Guatemala City Protocol of 1971: The Warsaw Convention Revisited:
Should the United States Ratify?, 124 PiTT. L.J. 3, 4 (1976).
21 In 1955 a conference held at The Hague produced a Protocol that raised the
limits of the carrier's liability under the Convention to around $16,600. The United
States did not ratify the Protocol. Very, supra note 20, at 4-6. See also Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 504-16; Mankiewicz, Hague Protocol to Amend the Warsaw
Convention, 5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 78 (1956).
22 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965).
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tween the air carriers and the United States Government con-
trolling international transportation involving a location within
the United States.23 The limits of liability for passenger recovery
under the Warsaw Convention were raised to $75,000 including
legal fees, or $58,000 in the case of a claim brought in ajurisdic-
tion that provides for a separate award of legal costs. Further-
more, the rebuttable presumption of liability was discarded in
favor of strict liability. The airlines waived the defense of due
care provided by article 20; consequently, the air carriers are
now strictly liabile up to a $75,000 limit for any injury covered
by the Warsaw Convention.
24
C. Article 17 and the Terrorist Attack
Strict Liability Rationale
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention sets out the circum-
stances under which airlines are required to compensate injured
passengers. The article reads:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the acci-
dent which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking.
25
The article does not create a cause of action but merely estab-
lishes a presumption of liability under the applicable substantive
23 The United States formally withdrew its notice of denunciation on May 14, 1966,
noting the approval of the Montreal Agreement by the Civil Aeronautics Board. 54
DEP'T STATE BULL. 955 (1966).
24 There has been a move to incorporate the Montreal changes, especially strict
liability, into the actual Convention. In 1971 a protocol was developed at Guatemala
City that would provide for absolute liability on the airlines' part, an absolute limit of
liability to $100,000 and changes in the notice requirement on tickets and baggage
checks. Very, supra note 20, at 8-12. The Guatemala City Protocol was signed on behalf
of the United States Government on March 8, 1971, hut has not yet been ratified by the
Senate. Id. 3. The protocol is, like the Montreal Agreement, a plaintiff-oriented exten-
sion of liability. See, e.g., Boyle, A Response to Lee Kriendler, 6 AKRON L. REV. 141 (1973).
Because the Guatemala Protocol has not been ratified the plaintiffs' theory for re-
covery in Day and Evangelinos was based on strict liability under the Warsaw Convention
as modified by the Montreal Agreement. For a more comprehensive discussion of the
complex and convoluted bargaining which surrounded the denunciation of the Conven-
tion and subsequent creation of the Montreal Agreement, see Lowenfeld & Mendel-
sohn, supra note 16, at 546-602; Very, supra note 20, at 6-8; The Warsaw Conven-
tion-Recent Developments and the Withdrawal of the United States Denunciation, 32 J. AIR L.
& Com. 243 (1966).
2' Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, T.S. No. 876 at 21,
137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
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law. 26 It was this presumption of liability for injuries sustained
while embarking that formed the basis of the courts' decisions in
Day and Evangelinos.
The decisions in Day and Evangelinos that the injuries sus-
tained in the Hellenikon Airport attack were within the ambit of
article 17 of the Warsaw Convention operated to hold TWA
strictly liable. In Day, the Second Circuit found no difficulty in
construing terrorist attacks as accidents within the meaning of
the Warsaw Convention. 27 The only remaining issue to be re-
solved was whether the passengers in fact sustained their injuries
"in the course of ... the operation of embarking. '28 TWA ar-
gued that liability under the Warsaw Convention should not at-
tach while the passenger is inside the terminal building.29 The
Day court rejected this "location of the injury" test in favor of an
"activity" approach for determining what are the operations of
embarking. Using the district court's detailed list of steps the
passengers took between their arrival at the airport and the ter-
rorist attack, ° the court concluded that where the passengers
had completed five out of eleven essential steps they were indeed
within the course of embarking.3 1
The court gave three reasons supporting this finding. First,
the passengers were embarking because they were acting at the
express direction of TWA's agents; 3 2 the unwritten corollary was
that TWA should therefore be responsible for their safety. Sec-
ond, a broad construction of article 17 was "in harmony with
modern theories of accident cost allocation" because airlines
were in a better position than individual passengers to "per-
suade, pressure or, if need be, compensate airport managers to
adopt more stringent security measures against terrorist
26 Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, No. 74-2672, slip op. at 2 n.2 (9th
Cir. Jan. 19, 1977).
27 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 890 (1976).28 Id.
29 Id.; TWA presented the same argument in Evangelinos. Brief for Defendant Ap-
pellee at 10-43, Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 75-1990 (3d Cir. May 4,
1976), aff d on rehearing, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
0 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y.), affd,
528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). According to the district
court the passengers could not board the plane unless they: 1) presented their tickets at
the TWA check-in counter; 2) secured boarding passes; 3) obtained baggage checks; 4)
were assigned seats; 5) passed through passport and currency control; 6) were searched
by the Greek police; 7) had their carry-on baggage searched; 8) walked to the bus; 9)
boarded the bus; 10) rode the bus to the waiting plane; 11) boarded the plane.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 33-34.
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attacks. 33 Finally, liability should attach under the Warsaw Con-
vention because administrative costs under the Convention
would be lower than the available alternatives, thereby lessening
the burden on injured plaintiffs and survivors.
3 4
The district court in Evangelinos rejected the "activity" test of
Day because "it extends the liability of the signatories to the
Montreal Agreement under the Warsaw Convention far beyond
anything that was within the contemplation of the parties. '35 On
an interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit36 the decision was
reversed. The appellate court adopted the Second Circuit's "ac-
tivity" approach and refined the test on rehearing to one focus-
ing on "the location of the accident, the activity in which the
injured person was engaged, and the control by defendant of
such injured person.
37
The court majority agreed with the result in Day but stated
that its reasoning "differs slightly. '38 The opinion acknowledged
the desirability of an "easily predictable rule" 39 but rejected
TWA's proposed "location" approach as "too arbitrary and too
specific.' '4" The court argued that if liability under article 17
were to attach only outside of air terminal buildings as TWA
proposed, future cases of a similar nature might have "differing
results resting solely on the fortuity of where passengers are
placed at the time of injury."'41 In light of its finding that "TWA
has assumed control over the group [of passengers waiting to
board] and caused them to congregate in an area and formation
directly and solely related to embarkation on Flight 881," ' 42 the
court reasoned that "TWA had begun to perform its obligation
as air carrier under the contract of carriage .... Thus, for all
practical purposes, 'the operations of embarking' had begun.
43
3 Id. at 34.
34
1d.
35 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 102 (W.D. Pa. 1975),
rev'd, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
36 Because this issue was one of first impression for both the Third Circuit and the
Supreme Court, a district court order dated June 26, 1975 certified the appeal pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 550 F.2d 152,




41 Id. at 157.
42 Id. at 156. In its earlier opinion, before it made explicit its location-control-activity
test, the Third Circuit said simply that "TWA had assumed control over the group."
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 75-1990, slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. May 4,




Chief Judge Seitz wrote a vigorous dissent, arguing that the
Warsaw Convention covered only the special and unique risks
inherent in air travel. The dissent posited that terrorist attacks
within terminals were not inherent air-travel risks and were
therefore beyond the scope of article 17's coverage. 44 Chief
Judge Seitz believed that other decisional law, both foreign
and domestic, mandated this interpretation. 45 Furthermore, his
reading of the Convention minutes and applicable commentaries
dictated that embarking be confined to the actual boarding of
the plane or trip across the traffic apron.46 Finally, he took issue
with the majority's location-control-activity analysis, 47 and pro-
tested that it was inappropriate to graft modern tort theories of
risk-spreading and accident cost allocation onto a treaty drafted
without reference to such purposes.48
44 Certain dangers, such as the danger of skyjacking, are encountered once the
passenger has boarded the aircraft. Obviously, the threat of skyjacking is not a
substantial risk borne by passengers within the terminal. Hence, while skyjack-
ing has been loosely labeled as a risk associated with air travel . . . it is evident
that such activity creates a risk only to those situated as to be exposed to the
danger.
Like skyjacking, sabotage or terrorist activity may pose a threat to passen-
gers boarding or on board an aircraft. To this extent, I agree that terrorism is
a risk which accompanies international air travel. I am unable to agree, how-
ever, that this particular hazard is an incidental risk of air travel when it occurs
within the confines of an airport terminal. Rather, in my view, a terrorist at-
tack inside an airport is no more likely than the bombing of a restaurant, bank
or other public place. Accordingly, I believe the majority's conclusion that
plaintiffs were injured as a result of a risk inherent in modern air travel is
unwarranted. The particular hazards of terrorism which are unique to air
navigation are simply not risks to which passengers in plaintiffs' proximity
were exposed.




47 1d. at 163-64. Chief Judge Seitz' rebuttal of the argument that TWA was liable
under the "control" theory stressed the non-objective and result-oriented aspects of that
test. He stated:
It is equally clear, however, that passengers at many locations within the
terminal are also, to a large extent, under the control of the airline. The
majority's control analysis is therefore, at best, imprecise. In apparent recogni-
tion of the over-inclusiveness of its control classification, the majority seeks to
impose yet another restriction on the class of persons who are entitled to re-
cover under Article 17, namely, membership in an identifiable group as-
sociated with a particular flight and located within a specific geographical area
designated by the airline. In effect, however, this additional restriction elevates
location to a position of critical importance. Control becomes a mere artifice to
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D. Judging the Appropriateness of
Strict Liability
By the use of the unspecific terms embarking and disem-
barking the authors of article 17 declined to define with cer-
tainty the full extent of an international air carrier's responsibil-
ity for the safety of its passengers. 49 Courts are thus forced to
49 The history of article 17 indicates that it was a compromise written to satisfy two
groups of delegates to the original convention. The technical experts (The Comit6 In-
ternationale Technique d'Experts Juridique A6riens-CITEJA) presented a draft for
the delegates' approval proposing that liability should be imposed on the airlines from
the moment the passengers arrived in the airport of departure until they left the air-
port of destination. The CITEJA version of article 20 read:
The period of carriage for the application of the provisions of the present
chapter extend from the time when the passengers, goods or baggage enter
the airport of departure until the time when they exit from the airport of
arrival; it does not cover any carriage whatsoever outside the limits of an air-
port, other than by aircraft.
II Conf6rence internationale de Droit Priv6 A6rien, 4-12 Oct. 1929 (Warsaw, 1939),
reprinted in Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 29, at 15. Some delegates opposed
this phraseology because they believed that the law should not impose on the airlines
duties outside their sphere of control. These delegates proposed instead that liability
should not attach until the passengers were actually inside the airplane. Id. at 17-20.
The dissenters' arguments were convincing enough to defeat the proposed aero-
drome-to-aerodrome liability. Id. at 57 app. The view that liability should attach
only when the passengers had actually boarded the aircraft did not prevail either. The
problem was referred to the drafting committee, which produced the compromise lan-
guage of article 17. Id. The compromise language created the difficulty in application
and inconsistency of result that would follow. Even before the drafting committee had
produced the actual middle-of-the-road text of article 17, the convention reporter
prophesied a problem that became one of the core concerns in cases arising from air-
port terrorist attacks. He complained: "I point out again that this last solution, in real-
ity, is not [a solution] and doesn't help anything at all, because a judge will always still
have to specify the exact moment when the carrier's liability begins." Id. at 56 app.
An examination of the scholarly literature sheds little more light on the meaning of
these terms. Prior to Day and Evangelinos no writer expressly considered the problems
in applying article 17 to terrorist attacks on airports. However, some legal literature
suggested that such accidents would be beyond the contemplation of article 17. In 1936
one scholar wrote:
If the airport waiting-room is maintained by the carrier, is an injury sustained
therein by a passenger within the terms of the Convention? The passenger is
present there for the purpose of embarkation. But again the purpose of the
Convention must be considered; no hazard peculiar to air navigation has been
encountered. To permit the air carrier to limit his liability as a waiting-room
operator would be a discrimination against every other operator of railway or
bus passenger stations.
Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention, 7 J. AIR L. 1,
20-21 (1936). In the late 1930's, there were two interpretations of the scope of article
17 liability. The broad interpretation fixed liability at the point when the passenger
leaves the terminal to board the waiting plane; the narrow view would limit coverage to
the actual entering and exiting the aircraft. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note
29, at 39. In his Evangelinos dissent Chief Judge Seitz pointed out that under either of
these interpretations the plaintiffs would lose. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1977) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
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construe the ambiguous phrase "in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking" with reference to var-
ious policy justifications for different constructions. In the air-
port terrorist attack cases the basis of decision must provide for
(1) a construction compatible with prior interpretations of the
intent of the treaty signatories; (2) precise definition of terms for
future reference; (3) fair balancing of the costs of injury; and (4)
deterrence of future attacks. Unfortunately, the Day and Evan-
gelinos decisions fail to meet these exacting criteria.
1. The Unsupported Departure From
Prior Case Law
Although the drafting history of article 17 may be incon-
clusive as to the precise definitions of embarking and disem-
barking,50 the Day and Evangelinos courts were not without re-
course to precedents interpreting and applying the terms. In
each of these prior cases the reach of article 17 was limited to the
risks inherent in air transportation. These risks were confined to
those activities in close temporal and spatial proximity to the
special services of the air carrier. This construction is not surpris-
ing in light of the particular concern of the Warsaw Convention
signatories with the added risks of air travel. What is surprising
is how superficially the Day and Evangelinos courts distinguished
this uniform body of precedent.
The TWA defense in the Hellenikon litigation relied heavily
on Mach v. Air France,51 an article 17 case decided by France's
highest court, the Cour de Cassation. TWA urged the courts to
take special note of Macho because it was decided by a "French
court, interpreting a treaty drafted and debated in its own
It is hardly likely, however, that the pre-Hellenikon commentators considered the
possibility of injuries sustained in the terminal as the result of a terrorist attack. As late
as 1972 attention was still focused only on skyjacking. Abramovsky, for example, wrote:
If these actions may be said to fall within the wording of the Montreal Agree-
ment, a passenger would not be required to prove negligence on the part of
the airline before he could collect since the Agreement promulgates an abso-
lute liability standard. All he would have to do is show that he was on the
plane when the hijacking occurred, and prove the extent of his damages up to
$75,000.
Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 339,
353 (1972). It might be unfair to read into these commentators' words instructions for
coping with situations they never imagined. It does seem fair, however, to note that the
majority view in article 17 scholarship points away from imposing liability on airlines
for injuries sustained in a terminal departure lounge.
"' See note 49 supra.
51 Judgment of June 3, 1970, Cass. Civ. Ire, 24 R.F.D.A. 311 (1970).
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language.'52 However, in the interpretation of a multilateral
convention where no nation's delegates dominated the writing of
articles and where precise translations are available, there is no
compelling reason to give special attention to the construction of
any particular tribunal.53 Nevertheless, even if Macho is not en-
titled to exaggerated deference, it does represent a strong ad-
verse precedent not adequately distinguished by the courts im-
posing article 17 liability in the Hellenikon cases. The plaintiff in
Machg sustained personal injuries when, led by two Air France
stewardesses, he took a shortcut through an area located beyond
the traffic apron but not inside the terminal building. The court
held that the plaintiff had completed the operations of disem-
barking when he stepped off the traffic apron. The Machg court
clearly limited the scope of disembarking to passage across the
runway. The French Court of Appeals said: "[I]f the Warsaw
Convention regulates, among others, accidents arising on the
ground, in the course of the operations of embarking or disem-
barking, it is only to the extent that these operations are taking
place on the traffic apron . . . -54 Although there may be no
convincing argument that the lines of article 17 liability must be
drawn at the traffic apron's edge, Machg is nonetheless an attrac-
tive precedent in the Hellenikon cases because of the similarity
of the paths traveled by the passengers in each case. In each
situation they traveled between the terminal and the aircraft by
crossing the paved runway, and in both cases the passengers
were injured at a point beyond the runway. The French court's
reason for holding that disembarkation ceases at the traffic
apron was that beyond that point passengers are no longer ex-
posed to the risks inherent in air transportation.5 5 The court
stated that the Warsaw Convention did not apply absent expo-
sure to such risks and that beyond the traffic apron ordinary tort
law should control.
56
Neither Day court mentioned Macho in its opinion. The ap-
pellate decision in Evangelinos tried to distinguish Machg. Besides
asserting that Machi was a disembarkation case and therefore
52 Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 29, at 28.
-3 It should also be noted that the United States Solicitor General has expressed the
opinion that any inconsistency of Machi with Day is "in the nature of dictum."
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 155 n.8 (3d Cir. 1977) (en
banc).5 4 Judgment of April 12, 1967, Cour d'Appel, Rouen, 21 R.F.D.A. 343, 345 (1967),
aff'd, Judgment of June 3, 1970, Cass. Civ. Ire, 24 R.F.D.A. 311 (1970), reprinted in





somehow different, the court noted that the French decision
opted against liability because M. Mach6 was injured in a "safe
place," far removed from the hazards inherent in air transporta-
tion and because his injury was not of the sort associated with
aviation-type risks.57 Terrorist attacks in the terminal, on the
other hand, were viewed by the Evangelinos majority as "risks
now inherent in air transportation. 5 8 M. Mach6 was injured
when he fell into a hole at an air terminal construction site.59 It is
difficult to discern why construction at an airport is not an in-
herent aviation risk but terrorist attacks are. Far more passen-
gers are no doubt exposed to the dangers of air terminal con-
struction than to the violence of terrorist attacks. The
Evangelinos' majority may be correct that "[t]errorist attacks
occur where there are concentrations of people in order to sec-
ure maximum publicity.'6 ° However, the court was too quick in
concluding that such attacks "therefore, are common in interna-
tional airports."' 61 The dissent correctly pointed out that equally
large groups can be found in a "restaurant, bank, or other public
place.
'62
TWA attempted to reinforce the precedential value of Mache
by citing MacDonald v. Air Canada.63 The plaintiff in MacDonald
had completed her international flight and walked through the
terminal to the baggage-claim area where she fell to the floor
and was injured. The court held that the plaintiff's injury had
occurred beyond the scope of article 1764 because she had
reached a "safe point inside of the terminal. '65 The Evange-
linos court found several grounds for distinguishing MacDonald.
First, the court noted that MacDonald involved a disembarking
57 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1977)
(en banc).
58Id. at 157.
39 Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 29, at 2 app.
60 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 157 n.10a (3d Cir.
1977) (en banc).
6 1
Id.6 2 d. at 159 (Seitz, C.J. dissenting). The majority chose a curious authority for the
proposition that airport terrorist attacks are an "inherent" air travel risk. The opinion
cited In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975), aff'd sub noma. Hernandez v. Air
France, 545 F.2d 279 (Ist Cir. 1976), a case that denied recovery under article 17 to
plaintiffs in a terrorist attack case. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d
152, 157 n.10a (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
63 439 F.2d 1402 (Ist Cir. 1971). See also Klein v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 46
App. Div. 2d 679, 360 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1974).
64 There was an alternative holding of insufficient evidence that an "accident" had
occurred. 439 F.2d at 1404-05.
65Id. at 1405.
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passenger, 66 and it noted the alternative holding that no "acci-
dent" occurred. 7 The court also applied the tripartite test of
location, control, and activity, concluding that the Hellenikon
victims had not reached a place safe from risks inherent in
aviation. 68 It is again difficult to see why falling down in a
baggage-claim area is not an inherent aviation risk but injury in a
terrorist attack is. One would expect more cases of injury in
airport buildings by falls than by gunfire.
Furthermore, the Evangelinos majority distinguished Mac-
Donald on the ground that the plaintiff there "was in no sense
under the control of the airline or acting as a part of a group
under direct airline supervision." 69 This distinction is not realis-
tic. Those who are waiting to retrieve baggage are under the
airline's control to the extent that airline employees tell them
where their bags will appear, how to retrieve the bags, and how
to file claims for lost or damaged items. The control exerted by
TWA independent of the Greek police was hardly more than the
direction provided by Air Canada to its arriving passengers.7 0° In
sum, the Evangelinos court did not adequately distinguish
MacDonald.
In a case growing out of the Lod Airport attack,71 In re Tel
Aviv, 72 passengers shot while attempting to retrieve their bag-
gage in the terminal were ruled to be no longer in the course of
any of the operations of disembarking;7 3 thus, the Warsaw
Convention's strict liability did not apply. The district court went
beyond this holding by stating that: "The legislative history,
however, makes clear that in drafting Article 17, the delegates to
the Convention specifically intended to exclude from coverage
accidents occurring to passengers inside an airport terminal
building. ' 74 This reading of the Warsaw Minutes is certainly not
implausible.7 5 In fact, to the extent that the distinction between
66 See text accompanying note 81 infra.
67 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 156 & n.10 (3d Cir.
1977).
68Id. at 157.
69Id. at 156 n.10.
7" The court apparently acknowledged that the authority of the TWA employees
was subordinate to that of the Greek police when it stated that the pre-boarding
searches "were required and conducted by the Greek Government and were prerequi-
sites of being permitted to leave the airport by plane." Id. at 153 n.5.
7'1 See text accompanying note 1 supra.
72 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Hernandez v. Air France, 545
F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976).
73 405 F. Supp. at 158.
74 Id. at 157.
7' The district court said:
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hazards due to the special risks of flight and other hazards is
emphasized, this view is probably more consistent with the con-
cerns of the original draftsmen than are those of the Second and
Third Circuits.
Another court limited the reach of article 17 in Felismina v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. 76 The plaintiff in Felismina exited the
aircraft, entered the terminal, and was injured on an escalator.
The court declined to apply article 17 because it found that the
plaintiff had completed the operations of disembarking. 77
Neither of the Hellenikon appellate decisions mentioned
Felismina, but the district court in Day distinguished the case by
noting that the airline did not require the plaintiff to go through
any routinized steps to deplane. 78 The absence of a disembark-
ing regimen did not contribute to the findings in Felismina, how-
ever. There the court said only that "by the time plaintiff had
boarded the down escalator, she had disembarked from
defendant's aircraft.179 The court may well have concluded that
the location of the accident was so removed from the aircraft
that plaintiff could no longer be considered disembarking.
It is clear from the discussion of the prior case law that the
decisions of the Second and Third Circuits in the Hellenikon
cases were a marked departure from previous holdings. Further,
the Day and Evangelinos decisions did not adequately explain why
article 17 liability should be imposed on the airlines for injury in
the terminal when it was not imposed by other courts in anal-
ogous fact situations. The judiciary ought to strive for consis-
tency, regularity and predictability in its application of any law.
These goals are particularly important in the interpretation of a
multinational treaty because differing results in this context
may compound the confugion already likely to exist among the
many legal systems involved.t ° The attempts of the courts de-
Whatever uncertainties there may be as to the precise line drawn by Article 17,
the above legislative history indicates plainly that the intent of the Warsaw
Conference in rejecting the CITEJA draft and in declining to impose in Article
17 the same extent of carrier liability for passengers as that provided by Article
18 for goods and baggage was clearly to exclude liability as to passengers for
accidents which occur after the passenger "has reached a safe point inside the
terminal," and "which are far removed from the operation of aircraft."
Id. (quoting MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (Ist Cir. 1971)).
76 13 Av. Cas. 17,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
77 Id.
78 393 F. Supp. at 223.
19 13 Av. Cas. at 17,145.
80 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1977) (en
banc); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) ("A multilateral treaty is rather like a 'uniform law'
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ciding the Hellenikon cases to distinguish adverse precedent
demonstrates the dangers in superficial analysis. For example,
the courts made much of the fact that the Hellenikon situation
involved emarkation rather than disembarkation. Although the
process of disembarkation may often be somewhat less struc-
tured than the steps comprising embarkation, they are essentially
the same. Both embarking and disembarking passengers move
about the terminal or the runway with limited autonomy. They
must obey the instructions of the carrier's agents or of local
officials if they are to avoid delay and confusion.
The draftsmen of the Warsaw Convention analogized the
two activities and dealt with them within a single phrase of article
17. Since they distinguished the embarkation of baggage from
the embarkation of passengers, 81 the draftsmen presumably
would have treated embarkation and disembarkation differently
if they had intended differing standards for the imposition of
liability. Consequently, the assertion that embarkation cases are
inherently distinguishable from disembarkation cases unjustifi-
ably separates the components of a phrase designed to be read as
a unitary concept. Decisions interpreting either portion of that
phrase ought to form a consistent body of law. Thus, TWA's
disembarkation precedents can properly be distinguished from
the Hellenikon cases only if their fact patterns differ in respects
other than the embarkation-disembarkation distinction.
2. Failure to Define Embarkation
Another weakness of the Day and Evangelinos decisions is
their failure to articulate a clear and predictable definition of the
elusive terms embarking and disembarking. When it was pro-
posed that the terms of the Montreal Agreement be made offi-
cial in the Guatemala Protocol,8 2 some commentators pointed
within the United States. The court has an obligation to keep interpretation as uniform
as possible.").
8 Article 18 provides different stipulations for liability in the transportation of
baggage than article 17 sets up for passengers. Article 18 reads in part:
(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruc-
tion or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the
occurrence which caused the damage took place during the transportation by
air. (2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding para-
graph shall comprise the period during which the baggage or goods are in
charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the
case of a landing outside an airport, in any place whatsoever.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 18, 49 Stat. at 3019, T.S. No. 876 at 21, 137
L.N.T.S. at 18.
8
2 See note 24 supra.
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out the desirability of clarifying the meaning of the crucial
terms:
If-as has been proposed by the Legal Committee of
ICAO-the rule of liability should apply also to dam-
age sustained in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking, it would seem advisable to
define clearly and unequivocally when and where em-
barkation begins and disembarkation ends.83
The same writer's prediction of difficulties in applying article 17
seems almost prescient:
Where and when does embarkation begin? At the mo-
ment a passenger enters the downtown booking office
of the carrier where-according to the ticket-the pas-
senger may report for the flight? Does embarkation in-
clude the ground transport to the airport arranged by
the carrier, or does it begin only when the passenger
enters the airport terminal building (which may or may
not be owned by the carrier) or when he reports to the
carrier's servant or agent at the counter? Or does it
begin at any stage of the passenger's movements be-
tween the counter and the parked aircraft? The same
questions can be asked about the meaning of the term
disembarkation. 84
The greatest effort by either of the Hellenikon appellate
courts to define embarkation clearly came in the en banc opinion
in Evangelinos. There the court expressly acknowledged the de-
sirability of devising "an easily predictable rule as to when liabil-
ity attaches. ' 85 However, the most specific test the court feltjus-
tified in formulating was its trilogy of three crucial factors
-location, activity, and control. Such a test falls well short of
being "clear and unequivocal" and contributes little in the way of
predictability. It is impossible to tell what mix of the three factors
is sufficient to trigger liability. The court further complicates the
analysis with language recognizing the interdependence of these
factors: "While control remains at least equally as important as
83 Heller, Notes on the Proposed Revision of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, 20
INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 142, 146 (1971).
8
4 Id.
85 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1977)
(en banc).
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location and activity, it is an integral factor in evaluating both
location and activity.)
8 6
The courts should have more seriously considered the pos-
sible advantages of other, more predictable tests8 7 before decid-
ing to adopt an unspecific approach focusing in varying degrees
on location, control, and activity.
TWA's proposed test, for example, provided that, while in-
side the terminal building, passengers could never be embarking
or disembarking within the meaning of article 17.88 Adoption of
this test would have the advantage of clarity for future use,
drawing an unmistakable line at the door of the terminal build-
ing. Furthermore, it has some support in the legislative history
of the Convention-apparently some of the delegates thought
they were establishing a rule of no liability inside the aero-
drome.
8 9
A second possible test would provide that passengers can be
embarking or disembarking only when they are within the exclu-
sive control of the airline or its agents. This test would be a
refinement of a concern touched upon in the Day and
Evangelinos opinions.9 1° However, application of the exclusive
control test would produce questionable results in some article
17 cases. In the Hellenikon cases the airline would not be held
liable because the passengers were partly under the control of
the Greek police. However, the airline would be liable for
M. Mach6's injury because he was acting at the direction of
two stewardesses when he fell. These results arguably disrupt
the uniformity desirable in the application of the Warsaw
Convention. 91
A third test could be developed from the logic of Machg.
This approach would mandate that the operations of embarking
86Id.
8 The Ninth Circuit recently declined an opportunity to adopt a bright-line test for
embarking and disembarking, stating that "since the Convention drafters did not draw
a clear line, this Court is also reluctant to formulate an inflexible rule." Maugnie v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, No. 74-2672, slip op. at 9 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1977).
Rather, the court announced a "total circumstances" test, id., and held that an injury
sustained when the passenger slipped in an Orly Airport corridor on her way from
defendant's flight to a connecting flight did not come "in the course of ... disembark-
ing." Id. at 10.
88 Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 5, at 25.
89 11 Conf6rence Internationale de Droit Priv6 A6rien, 4-12 Oct. 1929 (Warsaw,
1939), reprinted in Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 5, at 57 app.
90 See Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d at 155; Day v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890
(1976).
91 See note 80 supra & accompanying text.
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and disembarking mentioned in article 17 can only be opera-
tions that expose passengers to the unique dangers of air
travel. This test could not resolve the question whether a ter-
rorist attack is an inherent aviation risk but it could be used in
combination with a list of necessary criteria for identifying such
risks-for example, proximity to aircraft or flight equipment. A
passenger would be embarking or disembarking for article 17
purposes only when within reach of these dangers.
A combination of the three tests discussed above is also a
possibility. A combination test would restrict liability to events
outside of the terminal, under the exclusive control of the air-
line, and within the ambit of inherent aviation risks.
Perhaps the most intriguing suggestion proposed to solve
the dilemmas of article 17 cases is that of Heller,92 who felt that
while absolute liability might be fair for accidents which occur in
flight,93 it was inappropriate in embarkation and disembarkation
cases not involving exposure to aviation-type risks.94 In the latter
types of cases the airline would retain a defense under article 20
amended to read as follows:
In the carriage of passengers the carrier shall not be
liable for damage occasioned in the course of any pre-
flight or post-flight operations or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking, or for
damages occasioned by delay, if he proves that he and
his servants and agents have taken all necessary mea-
sures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
them to take such measures.
95
Whether or not any of the above-mentioned alternatives is
wholly satisfactory, each is superior to the ambiguity of the
loosely structured tests in Day and Evangelinos.
3. Weaknesses of the Risk-Spreading Rationale
While the Third Circuit did not expressly consider the con-
cept of risk-spreading in the Evangelinos opinion, the Second
Circuit in Day suggested that the air carrier should pay for the
passengers' injuries because it would be preferable to allocate the
92 See note 83 supra.
9' Heller proposed that the carrier be strictly liable only for damage sustained "in
flight." The definition of "in flight" was to be adopted from article 1 (2) of the Rome
Convention of 1952 (covering damage caused by foreign aircraft to third parties on the
surface). Heller, supra note 83, at 146.
9 4 Id.
95 Id. at 148.
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costs of the terrorist attack among the total population of air
travelers rather than to require the victims to bear the expenses
alone. 96 Although this analysis finds some support in the legal
commentary,9 7 it may be argued that the judiciary should exer-
cise considerable restraint in expanding the scope of article 17 to
cover essentially unforeseen situations. Chief Judge Seitz made
this point quite eloquently in his Evangelinos dissent. After noting
the Second Circuit's support for an expansive reading of the
article as a means of forcing the airlines to distribute accident
costs among all passengers, he explained why such a conclusion
was unacceptable:
While I do not question the soundness of these [risk-
spreading] principles in appropriate contexts, I believe
that the explicit goals and policies which were voiced
by the delegates to the Warsaw Convention and reaf-
firmed by the signing of the Montreal Agreement in
1966 foreclose reference to them in defining the scope
of Article 17. Had the signatories to the Convention
wished to amend it in order to reflect modern de-
velopments in American tort law, they could have af-
firmatively acted in 1966 when the monetary damage
limitation was increased and the airline's due care de-
fense was eliminated. Their failure to do so should not
be disregarded, particularly if we keep in mind that this
is an international agreement. 98
Notwithstanding the force of this historical argument, opti-
mal risk-spreading may still be a proper consideration in the
interpretation of article 17 but liability should not be imposed on
this ground without a thorough evaluation of the equitable and
practical consequences. 9 The Hellenikon courts, however, al-
96 528 F.2d at 34.
91 Cf. Abramovsky, supra note 49, at 359. Discussing the analagous situation of air-
craft hijacking Abramovsky suggests that:
Perhaps the knowledge that substantial judgements would be awarded to hi-
jacked passengers who have suffered serious physical and emotional injuries
would assure that such incidents would rarely occur in future times. Further-
more, and just as importantly, an innocent passenger who had suffered
through no fault of his own could and would be adequately compensated.
Id.
98 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 163 (3d Cir. 1977)
(Seitz, C.J., dissenting). It is probably an open question whether the Guatemala Proto-
col merely reiterates the traditional justifications for the Warsaw Convention or in
fact embraces the cost-spreading theories that some view as inseparable components
of strict liability.
99 Courts often do not take the long view but may be swayed by an appealing
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lowed concern for the financial burdens of injured passengers to
divert their attention from the question of who should compen-
sate them. The Dayv court mentioned the "crushing burden" of
costs to the plaintiffs," ' but none of the tribunals involved in
these cases discussed which of the parties was best suited to bear
that burden and there was no suggestion that governments
might absorb some of the costs of injury. The law cannot make
every loss compensable and there is no injustice in requiring
passengers to bear responsibility for obtaining insurance to pro-
tect themselves and their dependents in the event of unexpected
disaster. In light of the available alternatives to carrier liability,
the existence of an arguably applicable statute such as article 17
is inadequate grounds for imposing liability on the carrier unless
it can be conclusively shown that risk-spreading is best served by
such a result.
The court's use of the risk-spreading rationale in Day is also
ill-adapted because the situation at the Athens airport was not at
all analogous to the prototypical strict liability case. For example,
in products liability cases the defective product has been under
the exclusive control of the manufacturer and a reasonable ar-
gument can be made that the manufacturer should have been
more careful in the design or construction of the product. In the
Hellenikon situation it is doubtful that the airlines could have
prevented the terrorist attack. The airport was guarded by the
Greek government t ' and the pre-boarding physical searches
were required and controlled by the Greek police. TWA should
not be strictly liable for the terrorist attack because the Greek
government failed in its security responsibilities.?1
2
plaintiff in a particular case. This phenomenon has been noted by Professor Prosser:
In determining the limits of the protection to be afforded by the law, the
courts have been pulled and hauled by many conflicting considerations, some
of them ill defined and seldom expressed at all . . . . Often they have had
chiefly in mind the justice of the individual case, which may not coincide with
the social interest in the long run.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 16 (4th ed. 1971).
528 F.2d at 34.
,o, Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 153-54 nn.5-6 (3d
Cir. 1977) (en banc). It should be noted, however, that two TWA security guards
were also present. Id.
102 Strict liability for a given act should not be imposed on a party not responsible
for preventing it:
The concept of strict liability, at one time regarded as almost inconsistent with
legal principle, has been rehabilitated in response to an overriding social need
in a world in which technological development is constantly increasing the
range of dangerous activities which those responsible for should be required to
assume responsibility for the risks which they involve.
C. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 450 (1964). Because airlines
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As compared to the private airlines, many national govern-
ments are better equipped to disperse the costs of accidents over
a broad population. The imposition of liability on governments
would merely require them to bear the burden of compensating
passengers for the sorts of injuries government police forces and
intelligence resources are supposed to prevent. In this regard,
the Hellenikon courts should have given greater attention to
determining where responsibility for the prevention of terrorist
attacks should lie and who should provide compensation when
that responsibility is not fulfilled.
A decision that article 17 did not apply in the Hellenikon
attack situation would not have left the plaintiffs without a rem-
edy and would have had positive implications for the future.
The plaintiffs would have a case in negligence to the extent that
TWA was responsible, as they in fact alleged in the district
court' 03 If the refusal to impose liability under article 17 were
read to imply that governments may be sued if they are neglig-
ent in carrying out their airport security responsibilities, 14 then
future plaintiffs may sue the more responsible parties and gov-
ernments may be encouraged to tighten their anti-terrorist
measures at terminals. This result would benefit all international
air travelers.
The references in Day to "crushing" accident burdens and to
the urgent needs of the injured individuals'1 15 suggests that the
court may have assumed that corporate defendants have more
than ample financial resources. In fact, the pockets of interna-
tional airlines may not be as deep as the courts seem to think.
For example, hijacking has had an adverse financial effect on
international air carriers0 6 Hijacking, however, simply com-
are not responsible for injuries caused by an attack on an airport owned and managed
by another party in the same sense that they are responsible for injuries caused by the
malfunction of a complex jet engine, strict liability seems theoretically inappropriate in
the situation discussed in this Comment. But see Note, Warsaw Convention-Air Carrier
Liability for Passenger Injuries Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 369,
(1976); Comment, The Guatemala City Protocol to the Warsaw Convention and the Supplemen-
tal Plan under Article 35-A: A Proposal to Increase Liability and Establish a No-Fault System
For Personal Injuries and Wrongful Death in International Aviation, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
PoL. 313, 336 (1972): "[I]n comparison with the need to make economic provision for
injured parties, the fact that carriers may be held liable even though not at fault is
insignificant .. "
103 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 96 n.2 (W.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
393 F. Supp. 217, 218 n.l (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 890 (1976).
114 See text accompanying notes 118-35 infra.
103 528 F.2d at 34.
"0 Financial interests have also been adversely affected by aircraft hijacking.
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pounded the preexisting financial distress of international
airlines. 11 7 If the deep pocket of the airlines is largely illusory,
imposition of article 17 liability could conceivably have an ad-
verse effect on their ability to provide international transporta-
tion. For example, airlines might decline to fly into destinations
where terrorist attacks are likely for fear that their liability to
passengers in the event of an attack would be disastrous. The
Hellenikon decisions might convince airlines that broad con-
structions of embarking and disembarking render them liable
for so many potential injuries, including those occurring inside
terminal buildings, that it might be wiser simply to avoid some
destinations altogether. Of course, such a decision would deprive
the public in the affected areas of an important mode of trans-
portation.
A careful analysis of the concept of risk-spreading as ap-
plied to the Hellenikon attack situation indicates that the courts
may have allocated the cost of terrorist attacks to the airlines
without fully evaluating their capacity to pay and without con-
sidering the equities of imposing this burden. Although protec-
tion of the injured passengers is assured, the requirement that
airlines bear the expense of attacks which they may well be pow-
erless to prevent could actually lead to a reduction of air service
or to an unreasonable drain on the airlines' coffers.
4. Preventing Future Attacks
A fourth weakness in the result of Day and Evangelinos is
that the imposition of liability on the international airlines for
airport attacks might cause some nations to relax their airport-
security measures in favor of letting the apparently wealthy air-
lines shoulder the responsibility for preventing the attacks. It is
Airline companies fear the loss of passenger revenues and the destruction of
or damage to their aircraft. Insurance companies are concerned about an in-
crease in the number of claims by airlines and by, or on behalf of, those mem-
bers of the flying public who sustain injuries or death.
Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Supression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference
with Aircraft Part 1: The Hague Convention, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 384 (1974).
1"7 Pan American World Airways, long the pioneer and pacesetter in
routes and equipment, lost over $80 million in 1974, its sixth straight year of
massive financial reverses, and was forced into increasingly complex and bur-
densome credit arrangements which by their size alone lose their character as
secured transactions. But Pan American was not alone. TWA lost heavily in its
international operations (roughly $46 million in 1974), Japan Air Lines, Alitalia
and Air France incurred losses in the $80-100 million range, and British Air-
ways, Sabena, KLM, and Olympic among others, also lost large sums, as did a
number of the supplemental airlines.
Lowenfeld, A New Takeoff for International Air Transport, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 36, 44 (1975).
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to be hoped, however, that the governments' interest in promot-
ing tourism and stimulating commerce and foreign investment,
as well as an ordinary sense of responsibility, would combine to
create an interest in rigorous security measures at international
airports. This potential adverse effect of airlines' strict liability is
not nearly as troublesome as the three previously discussed.
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
It has been shown that the expansion of Warsaw Convention
strict liability to airport terrorist attacks is an undesirable solu-
tion to the problems of deterrence and compensation. This ap-
proach has received close attention because it has been successful
for two groups of plaintiffs and, consequently, may be widely
used in the future. However, there are other possible avenues of
legal recourse for plaintiffs and these should be examined. This
section will discuss two generally unsatisfactory approaches: in-
ternational criminal law and carrier negligence. The next section
will discuss what this Comment eonsiders to be the best legal
approach currently available to deal with airport terrorist at-
tacks: government liability.
A. International Criminal Law
There have been some attempts to deter terrorism through
international public law. 108 Commentators from the developed
world often prefer to regard all terrorist violence, regardless of
source or motivation, as criminal activity. Professor Baxter notes:
"Above all, we should not allow talk about wars of national liber-
ation and the events in the Middle East to distort our vision.
Indiscriminate violence, whether by way of war crimes, attacks
on diplomats, seizure of aircraft, or the killing of civilians in
third states is and remains unlawful."'1 9 Many other states, how-
'08See, e.g., AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (E. McWhinney ed. 1971);
Abramovsky, supra note 106; Hannay, International Terrorism: The Need for a Fresh
Perspective, 8 INT'L LAW 268 (1974).
," Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380, 385
(1974). Other articles from the West reiterate this viewpoint. Typical of this genre is the
following statement:
Where a person commits an act which threatens the stability of other states or
undermines the international order, he ceases to be a political offender and
becomes a criminal under international law, like the pirate or hijacker . ...
"[A] crime against humanity or the rules of war is of international concern and
should not be protected because it happens to have a national political objec-
tive."
Dugard, International Terrorism: Problems of Definition, 50 INT'L
AFF. 67, 78 (1974) (quoting J. Fawcett in British Year Book of In-
ternational Law 1958 (1959) at 391).
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ever, particularly those in the third world with a history of colo-
nial rule, have been reluctant to embrace any law which might
hinder anti-colonial or self-determination struggles.'" Professor
Bassiouni acknowledges: "Clearly, individuals who engage in the
kidnapping of industrial persons or diplomats, for purposes of
economic extortion or other personal gains, commit a crime.
However, when we enter into the field of self-determination
and wars of national liberation, the question becomes more
difficult.""'
Because of these fundamental differences of opinion as to
how terrorism ought to be treated, the international legal com-
munity has been unable to develop a comprehensive program of
criminal sanctions to deal with terrorist activity. Of course, even
if a satisfactory program were to be developed, it would not
compensate the victims. It could, at most, fulfill the deterrence
function.
B. Carrier Negligence
If the appellate courts had declined to consider the Hel-
lenikon attack within the scope of the Warsaw Convention,
the plaintiff's allegations of carrier negligence would have
remained." 2 Passengers hurt in airport attacks might be able to
make out a convincing case of negligence. At common law com-
mon carriers owe their passengers an extraordinary duty of care.
The carrier is required to assume an attitude of active vigilance
11" Some anti-colonialist states have made their position quite
clear:
Basically, Lebanon, Syria, and the Yemen Republic take an absolutist position
on this. Their position is that if you're engaged in a self-determination strug-
gle, whatever that is, you should not be bound by the law of war or other
prohibitions of terroristic strategy. There are about 14 other states which take
a similar position ....
Paust, An Approach to Decision With Regard to Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REv. 397, 398 (1974).
I Bassiouni, Methodological Options for International Legal Control of Terrorism, 7
AKRON L. REv. 388, 394 (1974). The author sees two ways in which international
lawyers can approach terrorism. The first option is to make terrorism an international
crime and to establish a transnational enforcement mechanism; the second option is to
concentrate on increasing governmental cooperation in regard to extradition for ter-
rorist activities already defined as crimes under domestic law. If the direct approach of
the first option were chosen, "terrorism" would have to be defined, a difficult task in
light of third world support for some revolutionary struggles.
112 See, e.g., Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 153 n.3
(3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). The Warsaw Convention was originally designed to limit
the liability of airlines, see text accompanying notes 16-19 supra, and provides the ex-
clusive remedy when it applies. See Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Av.
Cas. 17,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (damages action not barred by Warsaw Convention statute
of limitation because Convention was not applicable; clear implication that all claims
would be barred if Convention applied).
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to ward off potential danger. An Illinois court described this
duty as follows:
Knowledge of conditions which are likely to result in an
assault upon a passenger, or which constitute a source
of potential danger, imposes the duty of active vigilance
on the part of the carrier's agents and the adoption of
such steps as are warranted in the light of the existing
hazards."
13
Furthermore, the common law rule may impose liability on the
carrier for the criminal acts of third persons."
14
Applying the rule that passengers are entitled to special pro-
tection requires a precise definition of the term "passenger."
Courts would have the same fundamental problem in defining
where liability begins in applying a common law negligence rule
that they now have in applying the Warsaw Convention. Al-
though passengers seems to be a larger class of air travelers than
those "in the course of . . embarking"-a person nominally
becomes a carrier's passenger when the ticket is purchased-
-there is substantial authority that a common carrier's extraor-
dinary duty of care applies only while the passengers are in
transit.1 '5 A plaintiff might extend the application of the special
common carrier duty by arguing that the duty should attach as
soon as the passenger arrives at the air terminal. It is at this
point that the passenger becomes principally involved with the
status of being an air traveller. However, courts might be under-
standably reluctant to broaden the heightened duty of the car-
"' Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 111. 366, 379, 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1943). See
also Sue v. Chicago Transit Auth., 279 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1960); Fuller v. Southwestern
Greyhound Lines, 331 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960).
114 [I]t has been held that the special relationship which exists between the
common carrier and its passengers imposes a duty upon the carrier to protect
its passengers from the wrongful acts of third persons whether they be its
employees, fellow passengers or strangers. On numerous occasions courts have
held that this duty extends to the protection from fellow passengers who have
become inebriated and unruly, from fellow passengers who have threatened
violence, and from external criminal attacks by third persons.
Abramovsky, supra note 49, at 344 (footnotes omitted).
" E.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Carmichael, 33 Ga. App. 364, 368, 126 S.E. 269, 271
(1925):
A common carrier of passengers for hire is bound to use extraordinary care
and diligence to protect its passengers in transit from violence or injury by
third persons; and whenever a carrier through its agents and servants, knows,
or has opportunity to know, of a threatened injury to a passenger from third
persons .... or when the circumstances are such that injury to a passenger ...
might reasonably be anticipated, and proper precautions are not taken to pre-
vent the injury, the carrier is liable for damages resulting therefrom.
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rier. Such an extension would be inconsistent with the rationale
for imposing the greater duty: the special control which is exer-
cised over the passenger during actual transportation.
Furthermore, even if the courts were to impose the higher
duty of care for hazards inside the terminal, recovery would not
follow automatically. The plaintiff still must prove a breach of
duty. Sufficient proof would require some showing of the
airline's awareness of the hazard to passenger safety and some
showing of its failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the
injury. It is questionable whether any precaution the air carrier
might reasonably be expected to take would be effective in
thwarting an unannounced attack by determined terrorists, The
Hellenikon cases, which involved sudden unexpected attacks, in-
dicate that plaintiffs would have great difficulty proving breach
of duty.
An airline might be liable for ordinary negligence in some
circumstances, however. For example, if it were shown that the
airline recognized its duty to the passengers by hiring private
security guards,' 1 6 a claim based on actual negligence is tenable.
Victims of airport terrorist attacks do not have many prom-
ising avenues of tort recovery other than negligence. It hardly
need be said that an attempt to recover directly from terrorists
for their intentional torts is likely to be fruitless.'
7
IV. IMPOSING LIABILITY ON GOVERNMENTS
Many of the world's important airports are owned, managed
or effectively controlled by governmental bodies.' 8 A more
116 Even if the private security guards were independent contractors, the plaintiffs
can make a defensible argument: "[If] the hired police officers . . . were acting as
independent contractors .... the defendant common carrier was not thereby relieved
from its liability for the negligence of these officers in not adequately protecting the
plaintiff against a foreseeable risk." Quigley v. Wilson Line, 338 Mass. 125, 130, 154
N.E.2d 77, 80 (1958).
117 "Theoretically, a passenger could institute an assault or battery action against a
hijacker. However, in the vast majority of the incidents, such actions would be impracti-
cal if not impossiible to commence. Generally, hijackers do not possess sufficient assets
to make a tort action worthwhile." Abramovsky, supra note 49, at 341-42.
118 The International Civil Aviation Organization reports:
Among the ninety-three airports for which information on ownership and
management was received, there were no privately owned airports. Without
exception, they were under the ownership of a national, provincial and/or
municipal government. In seventy-one out of the ninety-three cases, the air-
port was owned by the national government, the remaining airports being
owned by lower levels of government or being under mixed ownership involv-
ing more than one level of government.
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, ICAO CIRCULAR 115, THE ECONOMIC
SITUATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS at 1-2 (1973).
1977] 1159
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:1134
equitable result than that reached in Day and Evangelinos would
impose liability on the Greek government rather than TWA. As
this Comment has noted, 119 the Greek police were responsible
for overall airport security. Furthermore, governments are able
to spread the costs of injury over the taxable population. It
might be argued that the costs of injuries associated with air
travel ought to be borne only by airline passengers. The benefits
of air transportation extend to many others, however. The whole
community benefits from the profits of tourist spending, foreign
commerce and airline supply. The cost of maintaining a well-
developed air transportation system, therefore, may be fairly
imposed on the population as a whole.
Making the government a defendant in the airport terrorist
attack situation would have the further benefit of avoiding the
chance result that can occur when terrorists attack a crowd in a
terminal. Those injured persons who are ticketed passengers
and are embarking can recover under the Warsaw Convention.
But those similarly situated persons who are not ticket-holders
will be denied recovery. If the government can be sued for fail-
ure to protect visitors to its airports, passengers and non-
passengers would have equal opportunity for receiving compen-
sation.1211 Of course, the equitable arguments for holding gov-
ernments liable for terminal terrorist attacks injuries are futile if
the result is unreachable under current law. The question is,
then, whether governments can be held liable for terrorist at-
tacks.
A. The Sovereign Immunity Barrier
In many cases where an individual is contemplating legal
action against a government, particularly a foreign government,
the bar of sovereign immunity must be confronted. 12  This
would be the case if the Day and Evangelinos plaintiffs had at-
tempted to sue the Greek government. Hellenikon airport is
owned by the Greek government and is under the sole manage-
"9 See note 101 supra & accompanying text.
121 See Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 284 (Ist Cir. 1976):
It is likely . . . that nonpassengers would be injured by attacks which occur in
locations such as baggage retrieval areas. To give passengers who are so in-
jured a strict liability remedy against the carrier-who, unlike the terminal
operator, presumably has no control over the situation-but to relegate the
nonpassengers to their remedies under local law, would be odd indeed.
121See generally J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(1963); Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, H.R. 11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign
Sovereign Immunity: A Timefor Action, 70 Am. J. INT'L L. 298 (1976).
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ment of the Greek Civil Aviation Department. 122 The best course
for the injured passengers is to sue the instrumentality of the
Greek government in the courts of the United States jurisdiction
where the instrumentality does business-ideally, in the
plaintiff's home state. It is unclear, however, whether the Greek
Civil Aviation Department does any business in the United
States. 123 But even if the "doing business" test is satisfied, the
common law rule is that the business enterprises of foreign states
are immune from suit in courts in the United States. Section 66
of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, "Applicability of Immunity of Foreign States,"
provides:
The immunity of a foreign state . . . extends to
(a) the state itself ....
(c) its government or any governmental agency ....
(g) a corporation created under its laws and exercising
functions comparable to those of an agency of the
state.
124
To avoid offending other governments by unfair or abusive
claims of sovereign immunity, nations often agree by treaty or
contract to waive immunity from suit for their business enter-
prises which operate abroad. 2 5 In 1951 the United States and
Greece entered into a treaty that provides for the typical waiver
of immunity for governmental entities engaged in overseas
business. t21 Article XIV (5) states:
No enterprise of either Party which is publicly owned or
controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, manufac-
turing, processing, shipping or other business activities
within the territories of the other Party, claim or enjoy,
either for itself or for its property, immunity therein
from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other lia-
122 Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 29, at 4.
123 Olympic Airways, the "flag" airline of Greece, was for many years under private
ownership but is currently operated by the Greek government. It is unclear, however,
whether Olympic is operated by the Greek Civil Aviation Department.
224 RESTATEMlENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW%, OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 66 (1965).
125 By consenting to be sued and waiving its immunity, a foreign government or its
agency avoids the Restatement result and subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
as does a private individual. For a discussion of the effects of waiver, see Flota Maritima
Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel, 335 F.2d 619, 624-27 (4th Cir. 1964).
126 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, United States-Greece, Aug. 3,
1951, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057.
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bility to which privately owned and controlled enter-
prises are subject therein.
127
This waiver allows airport attack victims to overcome the
sovereign immunity barrier and sue the foreign government if
that government's responsible agency did business in the United
States. For example, if the Greek Civil Aviation Department does
business as Olympic Airways in the United States, then persons
injured by a terrorist attack in the Athens airport can sue the
government of Greece. Of course, the plaintiffs might face some
difficulty as to the choice of tort law to be applied-that of
Greece or that of the United States.
128
Furthermore, plaintiffs in an airport terrorist attack situation
might have another ground for avoiding the sovereign immunity
bar if the Civil Aviation Department did business in the corpo-
rate form rather than under its agency appellation. There is
authority to support the proposition that a corporation wholly or
partly owned by a federal government is not entitled to avail
itself of sovereign immunity.
129
If plaintiffs injured in an airport terrorist attack were to
avoid the sovereign immunity problem on one of the above
theories, the obstacle would still not be totally removed. Under
United States foreign affairs law a waiver of sovereign immunity
can be overriden by the State Department.13  A suggestion by
the State Department to the court recommending that the de-
fendant be held immune from suit can result in a dismissal of
the complaint. Consequently, the threat of State Department ac-
127 Id. art. XIV (5), 5 U.S.T. at 1867.
128 Choice of law in tort actions, particularly where aviation is involved, has become
a very confused field. The traditional doctrine, lex loci delicti, required the application of
the law of the place of the accident. However, some courts are now applying the law of
the location which has more "significant contacts," where the "center of gravity" is lo-
cated, or which is "more protective of claimants." See Note, The Guatemala City Protocol to
the Warsaw Convention and the Supplemental Plan Under Article 35-A: A Proposal to Increase
Liability and Establish a No-Fault System for Personal Injuries and Wrongful Death in Interna-
tional Aviation, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 313, 317 (1972). Cf. Griffith v. United Air
Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) (decedent's death occurred in Colorado but the
application of Pennsylvania law was more appropriate).
129 See, e.g., The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946); The Uxmal, 40
F. Supp. 258 (D. Mass. 1941); United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31
F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Coale v. Sociht6 Co-ophrative Suisse, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1921); Molina v. Comisi6n Reguladora del Mercado, 91 N.J.L. 382, 103 A. 397 (1918);
Plesch v. Banque Nationale de la Rhpublique d'Haiti, 273 App. Div. 224, 77 N.Y.S.2d
43 (1948); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189,
20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1940). But see Dunlap v. Banco Central del Ecuador, 41 N.Y.S.2d 650
(Sup. Ct. 1943); Bradoford v. Director Gen. of R.R. of Mex., 278 S.W. 251 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1925).
13" See Isenbrandsten Tankers v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971).
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tion and the general difficulty of overcoming the sovereign im-
munity barrier make a suit against a government procedurally
risky.
B. Substantive Basis for a Suit Against
A Government
Tourism, trade, investment, communications, diplomatic re-
lations and other forms of international interaction involve the
presence of aliens and their interests inside host state jurisdic-
tions. International law requires states to maintain a system of
governmental protections for these aliens. A general doctrine of
responsibility provides that states must use due diligence to pro-
tect both the persons and property of outsiders within their bor-
ders and must take effective steps to prosecute persons who
commit crimes against foreign nationals. 131 As a consequence of
the due diligence rule, aliens injured by third parties should be
able to recover from the host government if it fails in its duty to
protect them. Therefore, passengers injured by a terrorist at-
tack in a state-owned airport where security is provided by police
officials should be able to recover from the host government if
their injuries are the result of the government's negligence in
providing protection.132 The circumstances under which an alien
may recover from a negligent government are described in sec-
tion 183 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States:
A state is responsible under international law for injury
to the person or property of an alien caused by conduct
131 See Lissitzyn, Hijacking, International Law and Human Rights, in AERIAL PIRACY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 118 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971); Draft, The Law of Respon-
sibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23
AM.J. INT'L L. 131, 134 (Spec. Supp. 1929):
Article 11. A state is responsible if an injury to an alien results from an act of
an individual or from mob violence, if the state has failed to exercise due
diligence to prevent such injury and if local remedies have been exhausted
without adequate redress for such failure, or if there has been a denial of
justice.
132 Due diligence is a negligence rule; therefore, to hold the state responsible for a
terrorist attack the plaintiffs would have to prove fault. Jenks confirms this analysis:
There was at one time a substantial discussion in the literature of international
law of how far international responsibility, particularly in cases of injury or
damage to the persons or -property of foreigners, was absolute or existed only
on proof of fault. The discussion related primarily to the responsibility of the
State for injury or damage incurred during revolutionary disturbances; as re-
gards such cases there will now be wide agreement with the view ... that fault
must be proved.
C. JENxS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 518 (1964).
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that is not itself attributable to the state, if (a) the con-
duct is either (i) criminal under the law of the state, (ii)
generally recognized as criminal under the laws of states
that have reasonably developed legal systems, or (iii) an
offense against public order, and (b) either (i) the injury
results from the failure of the state to take reasonable
measures to prevent the conduct causing the injury, or
(ii) the state fails to take steps to detect, prosecute, and
impose an appropriate penalty on the person or per-
sons responsible for the conduct if it falls within Clause
(a)(i).13 3
It would appear that persons injured in airport terrorist attacks
can make a case for recovery from the government under the
Restatement rule. It is clear that terrorist attacks are universally
held criminal within the meaning of section 183(a)(i) or (ii). Also,
terrorism is certainly an "offense against the public order" under
section 183(a)(iii). Plaintiffs in a Hellenikon situation face only
one difficulty in establishing negligent failure to protect. Al-
though the presence of Greek security police should indicate
that the government recognized a duty to protect airport visitors,
plaintiffs might have difficulty showing that the government had
not taken "reasonable measures" to protect them. It is doubtful
that even the most stringent security measures could prevent a
sudden attack of this nature. However, to the extent that plain-
tiffs can show that the government was negligent in carrying out
its security responsibilities, they should be able to recover. 134
Of course, the potential for establishing recovery under the
Restatement rule must be tempered with the realistic view that
some nations refuse to be bound by international law.1 35 Conse-
quently, although a claim under international law has the advan-
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 183 (1965).
134 It is generally recognized under principles of international law that a gov-
ernment is not responsible for injuries caused by private persons to aliens un-
less it can be shown that the respondent government has failed to exercise
reasonable care to prevent such injuries in the first instance or it has failed to
take suitable steps to punish the offenders ....
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 738 (1967) (quoting Letter from Assis-
tant Legal Advisor for International Claims (English) to John W. Smetana (July 17,
1957) (on file with U.S. Dept. of State, file 251.1141, Smetana, John W. 17-257)).
13 "At any moment of time, international law seems to be chaotic and uncertain;
'double standards' often appear to bind weak or law-abiding states, while permitting the
ruthless or strong to satisfy their demands with impunity." Masters, World Politics as a
Primitive Political System, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 114 (J.
Rosenau ed. 1969).
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tage of placing the risk of loss on the party best able to both
spread the cost and deter terrorism, it is still not a comprehen-
sive solution to the terrorist attack problem.
V. CONCLUSION
There are numerous defects in the existing set of legal re-
sponses to the problem of deterring airport terrorist attacks and
compensating the victims. The recent move by two courts 3 6 to
expand article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to hold airlines
strictly liable for terrorist-inflicted injuries in some cases is par-
ticularly susceptible to criticism. The possibility of international
criminal sanctions against terrorists and negligence actions
against airlines are also lacking as comprehensive solutions. The
best alternative currently available is international law claims
against the host governments that operate the airports. Weak-
nesses in this approach are problems of sovereign immunity and
the failure of some nations to recognize the applicable interna-
tional law.
The unavoidable conclusion is that judicial responses do not
currently offer any fully satisfactory solution. Legal reform or
response mechanisms outside the legal system are necessary to
fill the void. For example, the courts could abandon the Day and
Evangelinos rationale and hold that article 17 creates liability only
when passengers are under the airline's exclusive control and
exposed to a risk clearly associated with air travel. To compen-
sate victims outside the reach of article 17, states might agree to
waive sovereign immunity and apply applicable tort law.
If such legal reforms are not forthcoming, it would be desir-
able to examine the possibility of applying war risk clauses in
standard insurance policies to cover terrorist attack injuries.
1 37 If
present war risk insurance does not prove to be a viable alterna-
tive, a new system of mandatory terrorist insurance may be satis-
factory. Whatever the form of the ultimate solution, it must be
designed to both compensate the victims and promote attack
deterrence.
136 See text accompanying notes 50-107 supra.
137 See Comment, Acts of Terrorism and Combat by Irregular Forces-An Insurance "War
Risk"? 4 CALIF. W. INT'L LJ. 315 (1974).
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